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lN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION
ST A TE OF GEORGIA

SOUTHERN ST A TES CHEMICAL, INC.,
and SOUTHERN STATES PHOSPHATE
AND FERTILIZER COMPANY,

)
)
)

)
Plaintiffs,

)
)

V.

)
)

TAMPA TANK & WELDING, INC. f/k/a
TAMPA TANK, INC. and CORROSION
CONTROL, INC.,

)

Defendants.

Civil Action File No.:
2012CV210002

Bus. Case. Div. 1

)
)
)
)
)

FINAL ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The above styled action is before the Court on: Defendant Tampa Tank & Welding, Inc.'s
Motion to Dismiss, or, In the Alternative. Motion for Summary Judgment; and Defendant
Corrosion Control, lnc.'s Motion to Strike or, in the Alternative, to Dismiss, for Judgment on the
Pleadings, or for Summary Judgment ("Dispositive Motions"). Having considered the entire
record, the Court finds as follows:
1.

Relevant Undisputed Facts and Procedural History'

In 2000, Plaintiffs Southern States Chemicals. Inc. and Southern States Phosphate and
Fertilizer Company ("Southern States") and Defendant Tampa Tank & Welding, Inc. ("Tampa
Tank") entered into a contract to renovate a large storage tank and make it suitable to store up to
2.2 million gallons of sulfuric acid ("Duval tank"). The parties' initial Jetter proposal contains an

The facts of this case have been detailed al length in previous orders of this Court and in appellate opinions
and will not be repeated here.

express one year warranty stating: "All material and workmanship are guaranteed for twelve (12)
months from the date of completion[.]"
Tampa Tank. in turn. contracted with Defendant Corrosion Control, Inc. ("CCl") to
provide design, materials, on-site technical assistance and testing of a cathodic corrosion control
system necessary for the renovation. The renovation was substantially completed by January
2002. More than nine years later, on July 3, 2011, a security guard discovered sulfuric acid was
leaking from the base of the Duval tank. This lawsuit followed thereafter with Southern States,
through several amended pleadings. asserting claims sounding in tort and contract.
This case bas a long procedural history that is relevant to the instant motions. Southern
States initially filed this action on January 6, 2012. 1n October and November 2013, Tampa
Tank and CCI filed separate Motions for Summary Judgment arguing, inter alia, that all of
Southern States' claims are barred by the statute of repose. Southern States filed a Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment regarding the required use of a professional engineer pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 43-15-24, arguing the failure to renovate the Duval tank under the supervision of an
engineer or architect amounted to negligence per se. ln an order issued Feb. 28, 2014, this Court
found that any injury of Southern States was sustained when the Duval tank first leaked in
2011-outside the eight year statute of repose under O.C.G.A. §9-3-51-such that Southern
States' claims were barred and, thus, the Court granted Defendants' Motions for Summary
Judgment. In the same order, this Court denied Southern States' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment as to their allegations of negligence per se, finding O.C.G.A. §43-15-24(a)
inapplicable to the Duval tank renovation. Southern States appealed the ruling to the Court of
Appeals of Georgia.
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On March 27, 2015, the Court of Appeals reversed upon finding that, for statute of repose
purposes, Southern States' injury occurred in January 2002 when the Duval tank renovation was
substantially completed such that Southern States' injury occurred within the eight year statute of
repose. Southern States Chemical, Inc. v. Tampa Tank & Welding, inc. el al, Slip op. at 9 (Case
No. A14A2012) ("Southern States I").

The appellate court remanded the case to determine

whether a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether Defendants fraudulently concealed any
defects in the renovation. installation or testing of the Duval tank and whether Southern States
diligently pursued their claims after discovery of any such alleged fraud. Slip op. at 11.
The Court of Appeals found Southern States' claim regarding an alleged 40+ year verbal
warranty between Tampa Tank and Southern States was unsupported as the only evidence
offered in support thereof was inadmissible under the parol evidence rule in that it purported to
contradict a written term of the parties' contract which sets forth an express one-year warranty.
Slip op. at 13-15.

Additionally, the appellate court reversed the denial of Southern States'

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, finding O.C.G.A. 43-15-24(a) applicable insofar as the
Duval tank renovation involved the preparation of new plans and the substantial alteration of the
tank from its original purpose of storing molten sulfur to storing sulfuric acid. Slip op. at 16-18.
The Court of Appeals instructed that, on remand, this Court shouJd determine whether the
negligence per se claim was barred by the statute of repose after consideration of Southern
States' allegations of fraud and estoppel and whether a causal connection exists between any
negligence per se by Defendants and any injury suffered by Southern States. Slip op. at 18.
On Apri I 28, 2015, after the case was remanded, Southern States filed its Fourth
Amended Complaint.

In that amended pleading. Southern States abandoned their 40+ year

warranty claim and, for the first time, included a breach of contract claim based on the one year
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express warranty as well as a claim for breach of contract per se. On July 23, 2015. after
conferral with the parties' counsel and consideration of the appellate court's instructions on
remand as well as Southern States' Fourth Amended Complaint, this Court again granted
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and denied Southern States' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment ("July 2015 Order").
On the issue of fraud and equitable estoppel, the Court found the only statements made
after Southern States' cause of action accrued in January 2002 that could possibly support their
equitable estoppel claims are contained in a Commission Report prepared by CCI and which
Tampa Tank forwarded to Southern States. Although the Court found genuine issues of fact exist
with regard to one or both of the Defendants as to certain representations in the Commission
Report, the Court ultimately determined Southern States did not exercise due diligence lo
discover any alleged fraud by the Defendants because they never conducted annual testing of the
cathodic protection system as recommended in the Commission Report and, indeed, no evidence
was presented that Southern States conducted any testing specific to the cathodic system. Thus,
in the absence of an essential element of fraud, the Court determined Defendants were not
estopped from successfully asserting a statute of repose defense under O.C.G .A. §9-3-51 (a), and
found Defendants were entitled to summary judgment given this action was filed approximately
ten years after substantial completion in January 2002. Southern States then appealed the July
2015 Order.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed this Court's judgment that Defendants were not
estopped from raising a statute of repose defense upon finding no evidence of actual fraud or
intent to conceal bad been shown in the record such as would preclude such a defense. Southern

States Chemical, inc. at al. v. Tampa Tank & Welding, Inc. et al, Slip op. at 17 (Case No.
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Al 6A0272) ("Southern States If'). Although Southern States petitioned the Supreme Court of
Georgia for a Writ of Certiorari, the Supreme Court denied certiorari on May 2, 2017. The Court
of Appeals transmitted the Remittitur on May 3, 2017 and this Court issued a Judgment on
Remittitur on May 19, 2017.

In April 2017, while the petition for Writ of Certiorari remained pending, Southern States
filed its Fifth Amended Complaint. In that amended pleading, Southern States again raises
claims for breach of contract under the one-year express warranty, breach of contract per se, and
attorneys' fees and litigation expenses. The instant Dispositive Motions followed thereafter.
II.

Analysis and Conclusions of Law

This Court's July 2015 Order, issued after conferral with counsel regarding the posture of
the case and the then-pending claims given Southern States' Fourth Amended Complaint was
intended to be a grant of summary judgment to Defendants with respect to aJI of Southern States'
then-pending claims. This Court found the addition of the new claims asserted in the Fourth
Amended Complaint "d[id] not affect the Court's analysis of the statute of repose issues on
remand" and, upon finding Defendants were not estopped from asserting a statute of repose
defense, the Court concluded that "all of Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the eight year statute of
repose found in O.C.G.A. §9-3-51 (a)(l)(2)." (July 2015 Order at 4 n.2, 20). On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the Court's judgment without remand for further adjudication.
However, because the Cou11 of Appeals found Southern States' Fourth Amended
Complaint was authorized under O.C.G.A. §9-11-IS(a) and noted in particular that the viability
of Southern States' express one-year warranty claim in the Fourth Amended Complaint was
never raised below or ruled upon, the Court herein addresses such claims. To the extent that any
contract claims asserted in the fourth Amended Complaint survived the July 2015 Order and the

s

affirmation without remand by the Court of Appeals, and assuming arguendo such claims were
properly amended i11 the Fifth Amended Complaint while the second appeal remained pending.i
the Court finds Defendants are, nevertheless, entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to all
such contract claims asserted against them.

A. Statute of Repose
As previously stated in the .July 2015 Order, the Court finds that "all of Plaintiffs' claims
are barred by the eight year statute of repose found in O.C.G.A. §9-3-51 (a)(I )(2)." (.July 2015
Order at p. 20). in the Fifth Amended Complaint, Southern States assert two contract based
claims against Defendants: (1) breach of contract (alleging, e.g., Tampa Tank warranted and
guaranteed all materials and workmanship for twelve months; CCl promised to provide "a
properly designed cathodic corrosion protection system", on-site technical assistance during
installation, "proper testing" of the system, and an "accurate" commissioning report stating the
status of the system; the failure of the Duval tank and the cathodic corrosion protection system
"was due to defects in materials and workmanship" that existed at the time the renovation was
completed and which Tampa Tank failed to remedy; Tampa Tank faiJed to ensure that a
professional engineer reviewed and stamped its construction plans and was onsite to supervise
the work; Tampa Tank "improperly designed ... and failed to properly seal [the chime]" and
"misperformed" other aspects of the renovation; and CCI "faiJ[ed] to design a proper cathodic
corrosion protection system", among other allegations); and (2) breach of contract per se (again
alleging Defendants violated O.C.O.A. §43-15-24 by failing to use Georgia-licensed professional
engineers to approve and stamp their plans and to inspect and approve the work itselfj.:' Jn

Although Southern States added some factual allegations related to its breach of contract claim. they assert
the same causes of action in their Fourth and Fifth Amended Complaints. The Court's analysis herein of any
remaining contract claims would be the same under either pleading.
3
Fifth Amended Complaint,~~ 26-33, 38-40.
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particular, the contractual warranty claim is based on the alleged breach of an express one year
warranty provision in Tampa Tank and Southern States' initial letter proposal which states: "All
material and workmanship are guaranteed for a period of twelve (12) months from the date of
completion of this work].]"
The Court finds the allegations related to Southern States' contract claims fall within the
ambit of O.C.G.A. §9-3-51 (a) under which Defendants have already successfully asserted a
statute of repose defense. O.C.G.A. §9-3-51 provides:
(a) No action to recover damages:
(1) For any deficiency in the survey or plat, planning, design,
specifications, supervision or observation of construction, or
construction of an improvement to real property;
(2) For injury to property, real or personaJ, arising out of any such
deficiency; or
(3) For injury to the person or for wrongful death arising out of any
such deficiency
shall be brought against any person performing or furnishing
the survey or plat, design, planning, supervision or observation
of construction, or construction of such an improvement more
than eight years after substantial completion of such an
improvement.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this Code section. in the case
of such an injury to property or the person or such an injury
causing wrongful death, which injury occurred during the seventh
or eighth year after such substantial completion, an action in tort
to recover damages for such an injury or wrongful death may be
brought within two years after the date on which such injury
occurred, irrespective of the date of death, but in no event may
such an action be brought more than ten years after the substantial
completion of construction of such an improvement.
(Emphasis added). See Rosenberg v. Falling Water. Inc., 289 Ga. 57, 59, 709 S.E.2d 227, 229
(2011) ("This Court has repeatedly held that a statute of ultimate repose [such as O.C.G.A. §9-3-
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51 (a)] frames the time period in which a right may accrue, if at all. Therefore, if an injury occurs
outside this time period, the injury is not actionable, as there is no longer even an inchoate right
which may be brought to fruition by injury") (citations omitted); Wright v. Robinson, 262 Ga.
844,845,426 S.E.2d 870, 871-72 (1993) ("A statute of repose stands as an unyielding barrier to
a plaintiffs right of action. The statute of repose is absolute; the bar of the statute of limitation is
contingent ... The statute of repose destroys the previously existing rights so that, on the
expiration of the statutory period, the cause of action no longer exists") ( citations omitted).
As noted by the Supreme Court of Georgia:
The cardinal rule of statutory construction requires this Court to
"look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly ... "
(OCGA § 1-3-1), and "the 'golden rule' of statutory construction
... requires us to follow the literal language of the statute 'unless it
produces contradiction, absurdity, or such an inconvenience as to
insure that the legislature meant something else."' (Citation and
punctuation omitted.) Te/ecom*USA v. Collins, 260 Ga. 362, 363,
393 S.E.2d 235 (1990). Absent clear evidence that a contrary
meaning was intended by the legislature, we assign words in a
statute their ordinary: logical, and common meanings.
Judicial Council of Georgia v. Brown & Gallo, LLC, 288 Ga. 294, 296-97, 702 S.E.2d 894,897
(2010). See lnterfinancial Midtown. lnc. v. Choate Constr. Co., 806 S.E.2d 255, 261 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2017), reconsideration denied (Nov. 9, 2017) ("[A] statute should be read according to its
natural and most obvious import of the language without resorting to subtle and forced
constructions for the purpose of either limiting or extending its operation"). See also Gilbert v.
Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 747-48, 452 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1994) (citing Houston v. Lowes of
Savannah. Inc., 235 Ga. 20 I, 203, 219 S.E.2d 115 (1975) ("It is a basic rule of construction that a
statute or constitutional provision should be construed 'to make all its parts harmonize and to
give a sensible and intelligent effect to each part], as i]t is not presumed that the legislature
intended that any part would be without meaning'"),
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The clear and unambiguous language of O.C.G.A. §9-3-51 (a) provides that "[n]o action
to recover damages" related to deficiencies in the planning, design, specifications, supervision,
observation or construction of improvements to real property can be brought against those
performing or furnishing those services more than eight years after substantial completion.
Paragraph (a) does not distinguish claims sounding in tort versus those sounding in contract but
rather broadly precludes any "action to recover damages" brought outside of the eight year
repose period. Notably, Paragraph (b) of the same statute applies more narrowly to "an action in
tort to recover damages." The Court must conclude "the General Assembly means what it says
and says what it means" and that this distinction within the same statute was intentional such that
Paragraph (a) bars alJ "actions to recover damages" that fall within its parameters brought more
than eight years after substantial completion and Paragraph (b) applies more narrowly to tort
actions to recover damages for injury or wrongful death. Schofill v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys ..
Inc., 315 Ga. App. 817,819,728 S.E.2cl 331,333 (2012) (citing No1theast Atlanta Bonding Co.
v. State, 308 Ga. App. 573,577, 707 S.E.2d 921,925 (2011)).

4

As noted by the Court of Appeals in Southern States 11, "[i]t is well settled that a cause of
action for damage to a building accrues at the time of construction. Neither the discovery rule
nor the continuing tort theory is applicable to actions involving only damage to real property."
Slip op. at 9 (citing Mitchell v. Contractors Specialty Supply. Inc., 247 Ga. App. 628, 629, 544
S.E.2d 533, 535 (2001 )). See also Gropper v. STO Corp., 250 Ga. App. 820, 823, 552 S.E.2d
118, 122 (200 I) ("It is well settled that, "[t[he period of limitation on a construction contract

Although Southern States cites lo Natl. Serv. Indus .. Inc. v. Georgia Power Co .• 294 Ga. App. 810, 813
(2008) for the proposition that the statute of repose does not apply to contract claims, the case does not stand for that
broad proposition. Rather. in Nall. Serv. Indus., Inc .. the Court of Appeals held the statute of repose did not apply lo
Georgia Power's contractual claims seeking indemnification for expenses incurred in defending against a wrongful
death lawsuit where Georgia Power did not allege the contractor's construction was deficient and the
indemnification provisions contained in the contracts at issue did not require such a showing.
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commences on the date the work was substantially complete"; holding homeowners' cause of
action for breach of warranty accrued and statute of limitations began to run on date of
substantial completion of construction of their home) (citations and punctuation omitted).
Here, it is undisputed the Duval tank was substantially completed by January 2002 and
this action was initiated approximately ten years later in January 2012. Southern States I, Slip op.
at 9; Southern States 11, Slip op. at 2-3. Thus, Southern States' causes of action-whether
sounding in tort or in contract-alleging deficiencies in Defendants' planning, design,
supervision, or construction and/or the furnishing of such services for the Duval tank renovation
accrued by January 2002 and are barred under the eight year statute of repose set forth in
O.C.G.A. §9-3-51 (a), which "stands as an unyielding barrier to a plaintiffs right of action."
Wright, 262 Ga. at 845.5

B. Statute of Limitations
Moreover Southern States' contract claims, which were brought approximately ten years
after substantial completion, are barred under the six year statute of limitations applicable to
actions upon simple, written contracts. See O.C.G.A § 9-3-24. See also Gropper, 250 Ga. App. at
823; Fort Oglethorpe Associates IL LTD. V. Hails Construction Company of Georgia, et al., 196

5

Although Southern States contends application of the statute of repose to contract claims would violate the
constitutional right to freedom of contract, this Court is not persuaded. Notably, "[t)he purpose of [a] statute of
repose is to impose an outside limit on the bringing of lawsuits which are otherwise brought within the applicable
statutory period after the action has accrued." Armstrong v. Royal Lakes Assocs., L.P., 232 Ga. App. 643, 645. 502
S.E.2d 758, 760 (1998). Given this purpose of establishing an absolute or ultimate limit to pursue certain claims, "a
statute of repose cannot be tolled for any reason, including fraud." Oni v. Oni, 323 Ga. App. 467, 471, 746 S.E.2d
641, 644 (2013). But see Esener v. Kinsey, 240 Ga. App. 2 I, 23, 522 S.E.2cl 522, 524 (1999) (fraud or other conduct
by defendant upon which plaintiff reasonably relies in forbearing to sue may equitably esrop a defendant from
asserting a statute of repose defense). However. "[t)his is so because tolling would deprive a defendant of the
certainty of the repose deadline and thereby defeat the purpose of a statute of repose." kh at 471 (emphasis added).
Nevertheless. such would not necessarily prohibit a contractor, designer, etc. from foregoing a benefit the law would
otherwise provide and electing to extend its potential liability by contractually warrantying its work beyond the
statute of repose, thereby affirmatively acknowledging a contractually based right of action beyond the repose
period for deficiencies related to its work.
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Ga. App. 663. 633 (1990) ("The period of limitation on a construction contract commences on
the date the work was substantially complete").
Southern States contends a question of fact remains as to whether Defendants' fraud tolls
the statute of limitations asserting that, although the Court of Appeals previously found no
evidence of fraud in the record sufficient to estop Defendants from asserting a statute of repose
defense, Georgia courts apply a "lower standard" of fraud for purposes of tolling a statute of
limitations. The Court disagrees.
To establish tolling of a statute of limitations based oo fraud,
[a plaintiff] must establish the following three elements: (I) actual
fraud on the part of the defendant involving moral turpitude,
(2) which conceals the existence of the cause of action from the
plaintiff, and (3) plaintiffs reasonable diligence in discovering his
cause of action, despite his failure to do so within the time of the
applicable statute of I imitations.
McClung Surveying. Inc. v. Worl, 247 Ga. App. 322,324,541 S.E.2d 703, 706 (2000).
As the Court of Appeals has already held in Southern States JI, only actual fraud with an
intent to conceal wrongdoing and injury may estop a party from asserting a statute of repose
defense. Slip op. at 9-10, 17 (citing, inter alia, Miller v. Vitner, 249 Ga. App. 17, 17, 546 S.E.2d
917,918 (2001) and Hutchersonv. Obstetric & Gynecologic Assocs. of Columbus. P.C., 247 Ga.
App. 685, 688, 543 S.E.2d 805, 807 (2000)). Similarly, only actual fraud will toll a statute of
limitations. McClung Surveying, Inc., 247 Ga. App. at 324. See O.C.G.A. §9-3-96 ("If the
defendant or those under whom he claims are guilty of a fraud by which the plaintiff has been
debarred or deterred from bringing an action, the period of limitation shall run only from the
time of the plaintiffs discovery of the fraud"); Shipman v. Horizon Corp., 245 Ga. 808, 808, 267
S.E.2d 244,245 (I 980) ("(W]ithin the meaning of[O.C.G.A. §9-3-96], only actual fraud tolls the
statute of limitations. Actual fraud involves moral turpitude and has the effect of debarring and
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deterring the plaintiff from his action. Constructive fraud does not toll the statute") (footnotes
ornittedj)"; Bryant v. Golden, 302 Ga. App. 760, 762. 691 S.E.2d 672, 674 (2010) ("[B]efore the

running of the limitation period will toll, it must be shown that the defendant concealed
information by an intentional act-something more than a mere failure, with fraudulent intent, to
disclose such conduct[-]unless there is on the party committing such wrong a duty to make a
disclosure thereof by reason of facts and circumstances, or the existence between the parties of a
confidential relationship").7 See also Bauer v. Weeks, 267 Ga. App. 617, 619, 600 S.E.2d 700,
702 (2004) ("The fraud which tolls a statute of limitation must be such actual fraud as could not
have been discovered by the exercise of ordinary diligence").

6

O.C.G.A. §23-2-51 delineates the difference between actual fraud and constructive fraud. It provides:
(a) Fraud may be actual or constructive. (b) Actual fraud consists of any kind of
artifice by which another is deceived. Constructive fraud consists of any act of
omission or commission, contrary to legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence
justly reposed, which is contrary to good conscience and operates to the injury
of another. (c) Actual fraud implies moral guilt; constructive fraud may be
consistent with innocence.

(Emphasis added).
Southern States cites Hahne v. Wylly. 199 Ga. App. 8 I I, 813, 406 S.E.2d 94, 96 ( 1991) and Howard v.
Hammond, 216 Ga. App. 703, 706, 455 S.E.2d 390, 392 ( 1995) for the proposition that "statements made with
reckless disregard of the facts may toll a statute of limitations. and fraudulent statements need not be made with the
intent to 'conceal wrongdoing or injury .. ,. However. as stated above, under O.C.G.A. §9-3-96 only actual fraud
amounting to "moral turpitude" and "by which the plaintiff has been debarred or deterred from bringing an action"
will toll a statute of limitations. See McClung Surveyin!l, Inc., 247 Ga. App. at 324; Shipman, 245 Ga. at 808.
Further, Hahne and Howard do not stand for the broad proposition that statements made with reckless disregard of
the truth may toll a limitations period. In Hahn, where the plaintiff asserted a fraud claim against her contractor
arising from the construction of a swimming pool that damaged her septic system, the appellate court found
evidence presented at trial authorized a finding of actual fraud such as would toll the statute of limitations in the
contractor's statements assuring the plaintiff that the pool construction would have no effect on her septic system in
light of, inter alia, his "continued assertion" the septic system was unimpaired even after large portions of piping
were removed during the pool excavation and given the contractor lied regarding how much piping had been
removed. Hahne, 199 Ga. App. at 812- I 3. Howard, is inapposite as it did not involve lolling due to fraud and merely
holds that "(a) promise made without a present intent to perform is a misrepresentation of a material fact that is
sufficient Lo support a cause of action for fraud." Howard, 216 Ga. App. at 706. See O.C.G.A. §51-6-2(b) ("A
fraudulent or reckless representation of facts as true when they are not, if intended to deceive, is equivalent to a
knowledge of their falsehood even if the party making the representation does not know that such facts are false")
(emphasis added).
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Here, as to the alleged fraudulent statements made after Southern States' causes of action
accrued in January 2002, the Court of Appeals has already found no genuine issues of material
fact showing that any such statements were made with the intent to conceal wrongdoing and
injury. So uthern States

II, Slip op. at 17. Further, in tbe July 2015 Order, this Court held as a

matter of law Southern States did not exercise due diligence to discover any alleged fraud by the
Defendants insofar as no evidence was presented that Southern States conducted any testing
specific to the cathodic system as recommended in the Commission Report. The Court of
Appeals' analysis and holding as to the lack of record evidence of actual fraud with the intent to

conceaf and this Court's analysis and holding as to Southern States' failure to exercise due
diligence would similarly apply to and preclude Southern States' assertion of tolling of the
statute of limitations. Barring such tolling, any pending contract claims brought by Southern
States would be barred under the six year statute of limitations.9
C. Claim for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses of Litigation
Because the Court has found Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all
substantive claims asserted against them in this action, Southern States' ancillary claim for
attorneys' fees and expenses of litigation Likewise fails. See Steele v. Russell, 262 Ga. 651, 651.
424 S.E.2d 272, 273 (1993) ("(T]he expenses of litigation recoverable pursuant to O.C.G.A. §
13-6-11 are ancillary and may only be recovered where other elements of damage are also
recoverable") ( citation omitted).
The Court has considered the record, including the appellate court's remittiturs and the most recent
arguments put forth by Southern States, and finds the record evidence fails to establish a genuine issue or material
fact as to whether there was any actual fraud by Defendants involving moral turpitude and any intentional act to
conceal information from or to deceive Southern States so as to debar or deter them from bringing suit such as
would toll the statute of limitations.
9
Although Southern States assert a claim for "breach of contract per se" in their Fourth and Fifth Amended
Complaints, no such cause of action has been recognized in Georgia and, as such, it is subject to dismissal for failure
to state a claim. Even assuming breach of contract per se is a viable cause of action under Georgia law. it too would
be barred under the statute of repose and the statute of limitations applicable to simple, written contracts for the
reasons outlined above.
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CONCLUSION
Having considered the entire record and all argument of counsel and given all of the
above, the Court finds Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to any and all
remaining claims and, thus, hereby GRANTS Defendants' Dispositive Motions.
SO ORDERED this ~clay of December, 2017.
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